Author Topic: Minimum Essential Force (MEF) - Indonesia's Capability Upgrade Program  (Read 36774 times)


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it would say Indonesia is hardly messed up. they have their equivalent capability upgrade/Horizon program in the works (they call it the MEF, Minimal Essential Force) and are increasing their defense budget to match the rhetoric.  In other words, they are willing the stump up the cash in the tune of 10-20% budget increases yearly.

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Indonesia's defense planning and management

Post date: 20 Aug 2008 - by: Juwono S.
Defense planning and management is a comprehensive endeavor that encompasses six different areas. There are three core areas: force, resource and weapon systems planning; and three supporting streams: logistics, C4SRI (command, control, communication computer, surveillance, reconnaissance, information) ), and civil emergency. Defense planning relates to other disciplines, such as air and naval technology development, standardization, intelligence, operational planning, and force generation.

Given the current economic constraints arising from the government’s limited budget( Rp 32 trillions or less than 1 % of GDP of Rp 5,220 trillion, and 4,6 % of annual budget of about Rp 780 trillion for fiscal 2008) the underlying theme of Indonesian defense planning for the near and mid-term future is to enhance efficiency by drastically reducing leakages and wastages, especially in the procurement and acquisitions of weapon systems, defense equipment and supplies.

Force planning
Force planning deals specifically with providing Indonesia with the forces and capabilities of the tri-services to execute their range of missions, in accordance with the Indonesia doctrine of total defence and security (sishankamrata). It seeks to ensure that Indonesia develop sustainable and interoperable forces, which can function even with limited or scarce budgetary resources.

The force planning process is based on three sequential elements: general political guidance, planning targets and defense reviews. Political guidance sets out the overall aims to be met, incorporating President S.B. Yudhoyono’s concept of Minimum Essential Force (MEF) that establishes in military terms the number, scale and nature of operational readiness and force structure that the country as a whole should at a minimum be able to deploy.

Planning targets include both a detailed determination of an integrated tri-service force (Tri-Matra Terpadu) requirements and the setting of implementation targets to fulfill those requirements. Defense reviews provide a means to assess the degree to which planning targets are being met. The term ‘force planning’ is often confused with that of ‘defense planning’, which is much broader (includes non-military defense planning), and that of ‘operational planning’, which is conducted for specific, tactical and command-level military operations, including balancing strike force, support and maintenance/repair capabilities.

Resources Planning
National resources comprise human resources, natural resources and man-made resources. National resource planning aims to provide the country with the capabilities it needs, but focuses on the elements that are joined in common funding; each service (Angkatan) pool resources within a nation-wide total defense framework.

Resource planning is closely linked to operational planning, which aims to ensure that the Indonesian Defense Force (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) fulfill its present and minimum operational commitments and face new threats such as terrorism and bio-chemical weapons. There is a distinction between joint funding and common funding: joint funding covers activities, managed by the Ministry of Defense (Dephan) and TNI Headquarters (Mabes TNI), such as integrated acquisitions and procurement of common use items.

Common funding involves three different budgets: the civil budget, which covers the running costs of Dephan and Mabes TNI; the military budget, which essentially covers the running costs of TNI’s integrated command structure and the nation-wide communication and air defense networks; and the Defense Acquisitions Program that covers nation-wide procurement requirements for communication systems, air defense systems and networks of naval stations and bases, fuel supplies and command structures. The military budget and the Defense Acquisitions Program support the theatre headquarter elements for the Army, Navy and Air Force. Relatively speaking, these budgets represent a small amount of money, but they are important for the cohesion and the integration of capabilities of the tri-services.

Weapon Systems Planning
Weapon systems planning is one of the main constituting elements of Dephan’s defense planning process. It aims to support the country’s political and economic objectives and focuses on the development of inter-service (but not common-funded) programs. It does this by promoting cost-effective acquisition, co-operative development and graduated increased local production of weapons systems . It also encourages interoperability, and technological and industrial co-operation among the three services and related ministries and government agencies.

Dephan’s mandate is to cooperate closely with the Ministry of State Enterprises (Menneg BUMN) which has legal and financial control over five strategic industries: PT Pindad; PT PAL; PT Dana; PT LEN and PT DI; with the Ministry of Industry and the State Ministry for Science and Technology to prepare a long-term plan for developing defense industries which reduces reliance on foreign suppliers; and with the Ministry of Finance for purposes of fiscal accountability.

Logistics Planning
Logistics planning is an integral part of defense and operational planning. It aims to identify the different logistics capabilities that need to be acquired by the tri-services included in the Defense Planning Ministerial Guidance, and ensure that these capabilities are available to be used by the Command Units for operations. Logistics planning serves as the basis for the overarching cooperative logistics effort with the aim of improving the integration of national logistics planning processes during peace, crisis and conflict. At the force planning level, logistics planning consists of identification of the different civil and military capabilities that each service agree to acquire and to provide for joint-operations missions. The management of these capabilities in-theatre is then undertaken by Mabes TNI within the framework of the operational planning process.

C4SRI Planning
The effective performance of Indonesia’s political and military functions, requires the widespread utilization of Command, Control, Computer, Communication Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Information (C4SRI) systems, services and facilities, supported by appropriate personnel and agreed doctrine, organizations and procedures. C4SRI systems include communications, information, navigation and identification systems as well as sensor and warning installation systems, designed and operated in a networked and integrated form to meet the needs of the TNI. Individual C4SRI systems may be provided via common funded programs, or by joint-funded co-operative programs.

Co-ordinated C4SRI planning is an essential activity for the achievement of a nation-wide cohesive, cost-effective, interoperable and secure capability which can meet current and projected political and military requirements. It ensures that C4SRI activities conducted under all aspects of defense planning remain coherent throughout the life-cycle of systems and programs, and that end-products and services match real capability requirements.

C3I planning needs to encompass all elements needed for the achievement of capability. Capability does not just come from the provision of materiel (systems) and facilities, but also relies upon the existence of appropriate organization, training, logistics and personnel, and of relevant interoperability. In addition, the achievement of required system capability necessitates the application of a combination of the three core planning disciplines: resource, armaments and force planning. The C4SRI planning process influences and controls the activities of these planning areas to ensure a degree of coherence between them.

Civil Emergency Planning
Civil emergency planning has two basic dimensions: one dimension are the arrangements that are being made at the national level to protect civilian populations against the consequences of war, terrorist attacks, civic unrest and other major incidents or natural disasters. These include operational arrangements, such as disaster response coordination at national level. The other dimension is the planning to ensure that civil resources can be put to systematic and effective use in support of post-emergency strategy. In essence, this deals with the support that the civilian sector (e.g. transport, supply, communications) can give to the military, primarily in terms of civil support to the military in planning and operations, but also in terms of direct civilian support to crisis response operations.

In sum, civil emergency planning aims to coordinate national planning activity to ensure the most effective use of civil resources in collective support of national strategic objectives. It is a national responsibility and civil assets remain under national control at all times. However, national capabilities are harmonized to ensure that jointly developed plans and procedures will work and that necessary assets are readily available.

Selected Related Areas
There are a number of other related issues, which are closely linked to the defense planning process. These include air and naval technology planning, standardization, intelligence, operational planning, and force generation.

In brief, air defense planning enables members to harmonize their national efforts with international planning related to air command and control and air defense weapons. National air defense provides a network of interconnected systems enabling aircraft and tactical weapons to be detected either by maritime and ground-based systems or by interceptor aircraft. The extension of this air defense system with the civilian radar network is currently being considered by Dephan and the Ministry of Transportation (Dephub).

Naval technology planning aims to synchronize available domestic industry and foreign suppliers to ensure that maritime surveillance and defense match mid as well as long term requirements of deterrence as well as effective naval enforcement within and adjacent to Indonesia’s territorial seas.

Standardization is key to increasing the combined operational effectiveness of all military forces. It explores ways of improving cooperation and eliminating duplication in research, development, production, procurement and support of defense systems. Dephan leads in establishing industry standards, platforms and systems that affect production costs of key individual service requirements: e.g. infantry fighting vehicles for the Army, missile fast patrol boats for the Navy, transport aircraft for the Air Force.

Intelligence plays an important role in the defense planning process, in particular with the emergence of multidimensional security challenges such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Improved intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance as well as strategic assessment capacity are essential to ensure maximum warning and preparation time to counter armed and terrorist attacks. Intelligence sets out the requirements for the improved provision, exchange and analysis of political, economic, security and military intelligence, and closer coordination of the intelligence producers.

Successful military operations require the preparation of detailed plans to ensure that all the relevant factors have been carefully anticipated and weighed. The number of such factors is potentially great and includes the size, location, and likely duration of an operation; the necessary command arrangements; the rules under which it will be conducted ; special requirements imposed by the terrain, weather, and the availability (or otherwise) of local government support and the state of the local infrastructure; appraises the intentions and capabilities of adversaries; the need to collaborate with regional and international organizations; possible humanitarian emergency services.

Operational planning allows Dephan and Mabes TNI to prepare both for possible situations and for crisis response operations like those involving interdiction of illegal activities related to maritime security, border area surveillance and enforcement of binding legal agreements. Dephan/Mabes TNI develops, and periodically refines, operational planning processes that produce both advance (or contingency) plans and crisis response plans.

An essential element of this process is the requirement for political control and approval from the chief executive, and, where required by law, in consultation with and the consent of, the Commission for Defense and Foreign Affairs of Parliament (Komisi I, DPR-RI). The planning process needs to be flexible enough to accommodate interactive exchanges of political direction and military advice and to adapt plans to evolving political guidance during a crisis.

Force generation is the process by which Dephan indicate what forces and capabilities they will make available, for what period of time, against a list of requirements that Mabes TNI have elaborated for a particular operation, in the light of an operation plan, or for special needs like deployment or rotations of the Rapid Response Force.

Dephan is seeking to tighten the links between defense planning, operation planning, and force generation so that defense planning will be more rigorously conducted on the basis of likely future operational requirements. On the other, operation planning and force generation will be more fully guided by information on what capabilities are, or are likely in the future to be available. Dephan is also improving the force generation process itself to make it more comprehensive and forward-looking in the light of the country’s archipelagic structure.

Framework for Dephan’s defense planning and management process
In practical terms, there is need to standardize defense planning processes and defense management cycles. Each one of the services often devise individual and independent planning procedures and apply specific management methods unique to its mission. They also contribute differently to the overall aim of providing Dephan with the forces and capabilities to undertake the full range of its missions.

With the differences between the various components of the defense planning process and interrelated management areas, the need for harmonization and coordination is essential. While force planning has provided a basis for this harmonization and coordination, more was required. Dephan has directed the Agency for Research and Development (Balitbang)and Agency for Management Training(Badiklat) agencies to produce a comprehensive political guidance in support of the General Policy for National Defense.

Efforts to enhance and coordinate defense management are not limited to just within Dephan and Mabes TNI. Dephan needs to keep abreast of policy and strategic decisions undertaken by related ministries, especially the ministries for finance, national planning, industry, research and technology, maritime and fisheries, public works, energy and mineral resources.

The overall objective is to effectively and efficiently apply the capability requirements needed by utilizing the full range of human, natural as well as financial resources available to the government and to the nation as a whole.
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Jakarta set on military shopping spree
« Reply #1 on: October 31, 2010, 02:35:43 AM »
Jakarta set on military shopping spree
By Trefor Moss

Southeast Asia's sleeping giant has begun to make some surprisingly wakeful noises. After decades of underinvestment and international isolation, the Indonesian Armed Forces, known as the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI), are set for a capability overhaul that could reset the strategic balance of the Asia-Pacific region - at least if the ambitious pronouncements of Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro are anything to go by.

Having painstakingly assembled its first squadron of 10 modern Sukhoi fighter aircraft over the course of the last decade, the TNI's under-strength air force now aims to put together another nine Sukhoi squadrons in remarkably short order, Purnomo announced in late September - that's 180 planes in total by around 2024. This would be in addition to the 50 next-generation fighters which

Jakarta agreed in July to develop jointly with South Korea, and which could also be in service by the early 2020s.

Plans to buy two new submarines, probably from Russia or South Korea, are more in keeping with Jakarta's traditionally modest levels of aspiration. More striking, however, was Purnomo's insistence that the procurement program would be used to secure an indigenous submarine-building capability, enabling Indonesian shipbuilder PT Pal to build additional boats domestically. A pledge from Purnomo to invest in a range of airborne and naval assets to improve maritime surveillance further promises to redress a long-standing imbalance in Indonesia's defense apparatus, and bring the neglected navy and air force into line with the army, whose political influence has always enabled it to monopolize scarce defense dollars.

The question is whether Purnomo's grand plans will founder on the same financial and political rocks that have sunk TNI modernization drives in the past. The minister himself remains under intense scrutiny; as government appointments go, Purnomo's was a strange one. His predecessor, Juwono Sudarsono, was widely regarded as a capable technocrat with solid defense credentials, while Purnomo, appointed in 2009, brought with him a blotted copybook from the energy ministry and nothing in the way of defense pedigree.

However, it would be a mistake to dismiss Purnomo's ideas as the overreaching of a novice. In late October, Indonesian lawmakers showed a desire to fund the minister's plans by agreeing to increase the country's 2011 defense budget to US$6.3 billion (over $1 billion more than previously contemplated), potentially taking spending beyond the 1% of gross domestic product (GDP) threshold for the first time in many years. Strong economic growth of around 7% annually could now enable President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to realize his stated aim of increasing the defense budget to 1.5% of GDP by 2014.

Nonetheless, these boosts in funding may still trail Purnomo's big-ticket procurement aims. “The ambition is there and the need is real,” says Dewi Fortuna Anwar, a former assistant minister of foreign affairs and now with the Indonesian Institute of Sciences. “Defense has been neglected for so long and Indonesia needs to rebuild. But Purnomo is really talking about aspirations – there is a huge gap between desired needs and what Indonesia can realistically achieve. At the level of real procurement, the government will still be aiming only for the minimum.”

Talk of acquiring 180 Sukhois might indeed be fanciful, yet Anwar defends the Sukhoi program from criticisms that the money spent on the one squadron assembled thus far could have been put to better use. “The Sukhois are more than just a prestige project,” she insists. “Of course, one squadron is not enough - but there's been no money for any more than that. Right now it has an important training function.” Anwar agrees that a sharper focus is needed on basic naval procurement: she applauds the defense ministry's ongoing attempts to procure new frigates for the navy, but reckons that 300 new ships are needed to give the island nation the navy it requires.

Even with rising budgets, Jakarta will almost certainly improve its defense capabilities more gradually than Purnomo's blue-sky thinking might suggest. For countries like Australia and Malaysia, which would be wary of a militarily more capable Indonesia, this is an important consideration. “There's a perception in Indonesia that the country's military weakness has been taken advantage of by neighboring countries,” says Anwar, “but there's no clamor for us to have more planes than Malaysia, or anything like that. Indonesia is a developing country. We are not ambitious militarily, and will not sacrifice any development projects for defense.”

Just as important as updating the TNI's aging inventory is the boost that an increased defense budget could give to Indonesia's military reform process. Off-budget funding has always been a serious barrier to TNI professionalization, and adequate central funding should finally enable the government to force the military to divest its business interests - if there is the political will to do so.

In this respect, the Yudhoyono presidency has a mixed record: while the TNI has been removed from front-line politics, it retains some important privileges, chiefly its territorial command structure, which enhances the army's ability to operate locally without too much oversight from Jakarta. However, new allegations of army abuses in Papua could force the government into a further wave of military reform, according to Anwar. “Papua certainly puts pressure on the government,” she says. “There must be an end to the military's impunity.”

To a change-averse military, the bitter pill of reform would certainly be sweetened by a clear government commitment to a properly funded modernization program. As such, Purnomo's ambitious plans - even if they are over-ambitious - should be welcomed. As Western militaries contend with sinking morale in the face of budget cuts and program cancellations, the Indonesian military finds itself in the happy position of dealing with a ministry of defense imbued with a new culture of aspiration backed up, for the first time, by budgetary resources.

If Purnomo now satisfies the TNI by delivering on at least half of his procurement promises, he could buy invaluable space for the government to pursue further military reforms – reforms which, as events in Papua suggest, need to be driven through.

Trefor Moss is a freelance journalist who covers Asian politics, in particular defense, security and economic issues. He is a former Asia-Pacific Editor of Jane's Defense Weekly.
« Last Edit: October 31, 2010, 02:39:30 AM by Adroth »
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Aviation Week - Indonesian Air Force Eyes More Fighters
By Leithen Francis

SINGAPORE — As the Indonesian air force works on its plan to field around 150-160 combat aircraft in 12 squadrons, it is starting to consider how to replace its fleet of F-5s.

Current plans represent merely a “minimum essential force,” with the actual air force needs being much greater to provide the full range of military capability for a country the size of Indonesia, ACM Imam Sufaat, the service’s chief of staff, tells Aviation Week during the Singapore air show. The current force counts seven squadrons equipped with combat aircraft.

The current fighter modernization plan has the Indonesian air force fielding a fleet of Sukhoi Su-30 Mk2s and Lockheed Martin F-16s, with the latter comprising 24 F-16 Block 25 aircraft being upgraded to Block 52s and four F-16 Block 25 and two F-16 Block 15 aircraft for use as spare parts. The F-16s are to be delivered by July 2014 to form two more squadrons.

The air chief sees the need for more F-16s and Su-30s. While a type decision has yet to be made on the F-5 replacement, the F-16 is the frontrunner.

Growing Fleet

The Su-30 fleet is due to grow in the coming three years as well, with two aircraft to be handed over in 2012, 2013, and 2014. Indonesia is still in the process of finalizing plans for the weapons package for the fighters, with interest in a medium-range missile.

Midyear also should see the arrival of the first of 16 Super Tucanos to replace the OV-10s, with the first of 16 T-50 trainers to be handed over by Korea Aerospace Industries next year to replace Hawk Mk.53s.

The rest of the Hawk fleet is due to be replaced by the South Korean KF-X fighter after Indonesia joined the development program.

To help control the fighters, Indonesia is looking to field an airborne early warning and control system aircraft, although a decision is not expected before 2014. Even though the air force is buying C-295 airlifters, the service chief says the country would be looking for a larger system than the AEW concept put forward by Airbus Military. The AEW aircraft will need more endurance than the C-295 can deliver, he notes.

The fleet of CN-235s for maritime surveillance is being upgraded — with three more added for the navy — and the Boeing 737 maritime patrol aircraft also are due for an update.



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Aviation Week - Indonesia Seeks More Civil, Military Aircraft
By Robert Wall, Leithen Francis
Singapore, Singapore
Feb 23, 2012

As both commercial and defense interests in the West intensify their focus on growth in Asia, Indonesia stands out, offering the greatest opportunities. And with a major government push to build up Indonesia’s own industrial expertise, Western suppliers are looking to establish a foothold to bolster their chances of success.

Air travel in the world’s fourth most populous nation is poised for expansion, and airlines have a healthy appetite for new aircraft. On the military side, Indonesia’s defense forces have a long list of equipment they plan to purchase in the coming years, and—unlike their colleagues in some other Asian countries—they appear to be relatively successful at getting budgets approved.

To help direct the fighters, Indonesia would like to field an airborne early warning and control system aircraft, although a decision is not expected before 2014, says Imam. Even though the air force is buying C295 airlifters, he says Indonesia would want a larger system than the AEW concept put forward by Airbus Military. The AEW aircraft will need more endurance than the C295 can deliver, he notes.

The airlifter has nevertheless firmly established itself in Indonesia. At the Singapore air show, Airbus Military secured an order from the Indonesian defense ministry for nine C295s, to be operated as transport aircraft from Halim air base.

Sales to the Indonesian army and domestic security forces may follow, says Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro. Moreover, special-mission sales in Indonesia may be possible as the country addresses anti-submarine warfare, maritime patrol and search-and-rescue requirements, says Airbus Military President and CEO Domingo Urena-Raso. The initial agreement covers only transport aircraft.

To secure the deal, Airbus Military gave a firm commitment to work with state-owned PT Dirgantara Indonesia, which will see its workshare increase gradually as the program progresses, says PTDI President and CEO Budi Santoso. The company will end up—around the last two or three aircraft—with a “light” final assembly line (FAL). Initial activity will focus on the tail empennage, rear fuselage and fuselage panels, as well as on the computer-based training system for the global C295 program. Depending on market demand, the Indonesian light FAL could produce aircraft for other countries. The Spanish FAL, which currently turns out roughly 18 CN235s and C295s per year, will remain open, says Urena-Raso.

The program builds on the CN235 and C212 relationship between Airbus Military and PTDI.

Similarly, Lockheed Martin has made a strategic decision to focus on Indonesia. Having already expanded its F-16 foothold, the company now hopes to secure a contract for more than 40 TPS-77 and FPS-117 ground-based air surveillance radars. To help underpin its push, Lockheed will open a Jakarta office, says Jim Gribbon, Asia-Pacific regional president.

Lockheed Martin also signed an industrial agreement on Feb. 14 with privately owned PT CMI Teknologi. CMI’s role will be to build parts and systems for the radar, conduct acceptance tests and maintain the radars in-country, says Gribbon.

Currently, Indonesia has too few radars and the ones it has are from a mix of suppliers; some of the equipment dates back to the 1970s. “By integrating new sensors with Indonesia’s command-and-control system, the Nasri [National Airspace Surveillance Republic of Indonesia] network will greatly enhance air sovereignty and surveillance over the country’s more than 17,000 islands, which span a distance wider than the U.S.,” says Gribbon.

Giving Indonesia the capability to maintain the radars is significant because it should make the country less reliant on overseas suppliers for spare parts—an important consideration, especially since Indonesia has been subjected to embargoes.

For Lockheed Martin, the partnership may offer a way to ease sales owing to an Indonesian rule allowing sole-source contracts to be awarded to businesses that have at least a 30-50% local workshare.

The radar proposed by Lockheed Martin is dual-use. Data feeds from the network also will enhance civilian air traffic control, including commercial air traffic management (ATM), some of which is now handled by radars in nearby Singapore, according to Lockheed Martin.

Radar coverage for commercial aviation is an issue in Indonesia because the current ATM system is struggling to keep pace with growth in Indonesia’s airline industry. This problem came to the fore on Jan. 1, 2007, when an Adam Air Boeing 737-400 crashed a short distance off the coast of Sulawesi island, killing all on board. It took weeks to locate the aircraft because it was in an area without adequate radar coverage.

Meanwhile, Gribbon is bullish about Indonesia’s market potential. “In the past two years, they’ve doubled the [defense] budget each year,” he says. “It is a big country with a huge land mass and sea area to cover,” so it makes sense for Indonesia to build its defense capability, he adds.



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Re: Minimum Essential Force (MEF) - Indonesia's Capability Upgrade Program
« Reply #4 on: September 22, 2012, 06:15:35 AM »
An good article re. MEF ...

ASEAN Security Community vs Minimum Essential Force
Andi Widjajanto, Jakarta | Opinion | Thu, November 24 2011, 10:03 AM

There is an inconsistency between Indonesia’s defense and foreign policies as a result of competing paradigms that serve as the foundations of these policies.

To explore how these two competing paradigms create a disintegrative national security policy, I analyze two major goals of Indonesia’s national security policy: ASEAN Security Community (ASC) 2015 and the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) 2024.

Currently, Indonesia’s defense policy is based on four documents: Grand Strategy 2008, Defense Doctrine 2008, Defense Intelligence Estimate 2008 and Defense Posture 2024.

These four documents mark a significant shift in our defense policy from one that focused on internal security operations during the Soeharto era to one that tries to create a modern, integrated armed forces that is able to anticipate security challenges in the 21st century.

Unlike the defense policy that has published four legal documents, Indonesia’s foreign policy is based on President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s doctrine of “one thousand friends, zero enemies”, and Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa’s doctrine of “dynamic equilibrium”.

These two doctrines coexist with the midterm goal to create an ASEAN Community in 2015.

In the realm of defense, the evolution of Indonesia’s defense policy was initiated in 1999 when the country decided to start reforming its military, making it into a professional organization by eliminating the notions of a political- and business-oriented army.

Ideally, this military reform will be followed by a defense transformation that will try to close the strategic gap between the current force and future force.

This gap will be closed by ini-tiating the program of military reduction that tries to remove obsolete military technologies from Indonesia’s weapons system as well as by implementing a military modernization program aiming to create a Minimal Essential Force by 2024.

The MEF 2024 will serve as a transition force until Indonesia is able to initiate a military innovation program that will try to adopt the most advanced military technology to start a revolution in military affairs that will transform TNI into an agile force of the 21st century.

In terms of force projection, the military sets up two strategic plans. The first is strategic, planning to create MEF 2024, the second is strategic planning to establish a future force for 2050.

According to these two plans, theoretically, TNI will adopt four different concepts of force ratio to project its transformation until 2050.

The first projection utilizes the concept of force-to-risk ration to create a force that will be able to deal with security risks such as internal conflicts, border disputes, terrorism and transnational security issues. This force will be supported by 1 percent of GDP and is expected to be achieved in 2014.

The second projection uses the concept of force to space ratio to create a military that will be able to protect Indonesia’s vast territory.

This force — although will rely on forward deployment especially of border divisions, naval patrol, as well as air control — will mainly be defensive in nature. This force is projected to be achieved in 2020 and will be supported by 1.5-2 percent of GDP.

The third projection uses the concept of force-to-force ratio to create a military that will be able to employ a balancing strategy especially against neighboring states that deploy offensive and provocative forces to Indonesia’s border areas.

To achieve this force, Indonesia will allocate 2.5-3 percent of GDP each year until this force is established between 2024 and 2029.

The last projection uses the development of military technology as the main component to create a future force of 21st century. This force will be established by integrating the latest advancements in military technology in the military doctrine-strategy and weapon systems.

The integration means Indonesia will implement long-term modernization and even arms acquisition programs.

To support these programs, 3.5-4 percent of GDP will be allocated to support the defense budget until this force is achieved in 2050. These programs will transform Indonesia’s military to become an offensive force that has a reliable deterrence strategy.

These programs could result in an arms race in the region that will increase the probability of regional conflict between states in Southeast Asia.

By analyzing two policies of ASC 2015 and MEF 2024, we can find significant differences between the trajectory of security goals projected by the foreign and defense policies.

The foreign policy has a more optimistic trajectory indicated by the establishment of ASC in 2015 that will bring peace and stability in the region. However, the defense policy has a more pessimistic and realistic trajectory that projects a long-term evolution of military force.

The trajectory also projects a long-term evolution of military changes that consist of three main programs of military reform, defense transformation and military innovation.

These competing trajectories give clear indications of the existence of a disintegrative national security policy: Our foreign policy is not coherent with our defense policy.

The foreign policy projects the paradigm of liberal institutionalism that relies on a strategy of institutionalization of liberal norms in Southeast Asia.

The concept of “one thousand friends, zero enemies”, “dynamic equilibrium” or a “security community” resonate with how Indonesia’s foreign policy is closer to a liberal institutionalist paradigm than a realist one. In contrast, the defense policy represents the defense realism paradigm.

Since the policy of band-wagoning will never be an option for Indonesia’s military, the strategy of balancing will be continuously used and modified to create future force suited for the 21st century.

This paradigm guides the trajectory of Indonesia’s military to implement a defense transformation and military innovation program to create a more modern force that has a more advanced weapons system.

If Indonesia manages to achieve both the ASC 2015 and MEF 2024, then there will be a puzzling regional security architecture in Southeast Asia. We may see the creation of a security community that coexists with an offensive and provocative force deployment.

The writer is a lecturer at the Department of International Relations, University of Indonesia.


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Indonesian president vows to outgun Australia
By Indonesia correspondent George Roberts

Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono says his country should strive to have a more powerful military than Australia.

About 16,000 Indonesian troops are preparing for joint military exercises in East Java.

Meeting with military commanders, Mr Yudhoyono told them that Indonesia's military should be bigger and more modern than countries like Australia, Singapore and Malaysia.

Indonesia's military boasts 470,000 active troops, while the Australian Defence Force has just over 80,000 full-time personnel and reservists..

It has also embarked on a military upgrade program, building warships and drones, as well buying fighter jets, helicopters and rockets.


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Re: Minimum Essential Force (MEF) - Indonesia's Capability Upgrade Program
« Reply #6 on: February 19, 2014, 10:14:46 PM »
RI to focus on 7 weapon systems this year

Novan Iman Santosa, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | National | Wed, February 19 2014, 7:09 PM

Indonesia will focus on developing and producing seven weapon systems this year to modernize its arsenal and strengthen local defense industries to reduce the dependence on foreign suppliers.

The systems are submarines, jet fighters, medium tanks, missiles, radars, propellants and communications devices, said Defense Industry Policy Committee (KKIP) special staff for cooperation and institutional relations Silmy Karim on Wednesday.

Both the submarines and jet fighters are being developed as national programs with South Korea while the medium tank is being developed in cooperation with Turkish company FNSS Defense System.

While there is already missile cooperation with China, Silmy said the KKIP was still looking at partners for the local production of radar and communication devices.

“We will soon have a propellant factory that is important if we want to develop our own ammunition, missiles and rockets,” he said, without revealing which country the cooperation was being held with. (dhi)


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Since we are now at the final year of the 1st Strategic Plan (Renstra 1) as part of the MEF program, lets review the former shopping list by checking the items according to the current updates.

2010 - 2014 Plan

1. MBT Procurement program, 103 units of Leopard 2A4
Status : 103 units ordered, 2 delivered
2. Procurement program of 50 units Marder IFV
Status : 50 units ordered, 2 delivered
3. Procurement program of 36 units of Astros II MLRS
Status : 36 units ordered, waiting for the 1st batch in December 2014
4. Procurement of 37 units of Nexter Caesar 155 SPA
Status : 37 units ordered, waiting for delivery in 2014.
5. Procurement program , 8 units of Apache AH-64 E Gunship
Status : Contract Signed, waiting for delivery in 2017
6. Procurement program, 8 units of MI-35 Hind, Assault Gunship
Status : Delivered.
7. Procurement program, 16 units of MI-17 Heavy Transport Heli
Status : Delivered

Air Force 
1. Su-27/30 full squadron strength (16 units)
Status : Achieved in 2013
2. 24 units of  F-16 grant / upgrade project
Status : Upgrading progress, waiting for the 1st batch in mid 2014
3. Procurement program, 16 units of Embraer's Super Tucano
Status : 16 ordered, 4 delivered, waiting for 2nd bacth delivery in 2014.
4. Procurement program, 6 units of EC 725 Cougar
Status : 6 ordered, waiting for delivery in 2014 - 2015 (10 more will be ordered in 2015)
5. Procurement program, 16 units of KAI T-50i
Status : 16 ordered in May 2011, all units delivered by 2014.

1. Procurement and TOT Program, 3 units of Chang Bogo Class Submarines
Status : 3 ordered, under construction, to be delivered in 2015 - 2018
2. Procurement Program, 2 units of Sigma 10514 Frigates
Status : 2 ordered, under construction, 1st unit be delivered in 2016
3. Procurement Program, 4 units of LPD (Makassar & Banjarmasin Class)
Status : All delivered
4. Procurement program, 54 units of BMP 3F
Status : All Delivered

2015 - 2019 Plan

1. Procurement program, 17 Blackhawk Helicopter
Status : Budget Proposed
2. Procurement program, 3 unit Chinook Helicopter
Status : Budget proposed
3. 1st Prototype of Indo-South Korea 5th Generation Fighter
Status : ???

I hope we can all participating by updating the above list (Copy-paste + Status/items updates or revision)
Anyone can help me completing the list or any revision ?
I Asked the US Special Forces : "What will you teach us? you failed in Mayaguez operation, You failed in rescuing the hostage in Iran and Son Tay prison in Vietnam! what will you teach us? your Failure????"  ~ Leonardus Benjamin 'Benny' Moerdani, Indonesian Army Commander 1983 -1988.



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you forgotten some nbell-412, anoa apc, c-90 & javelin atgm, mistral & starstreak shorad, kh178 & 198 howitzer, rebuild amx-105 for the army, some hercs, c-295, c-235mpa, grob trainer, skyshield adms, some ground based radars for the airforce,
and you also forgot nahkoda ragam class, klewang class, clurit class, cn-235 asw, nc-212 mpa, some retrofitting project for the parchim and fatahillah class, and those all on MEF I stage

and kohanudnas had been reactivating wing 100 & 300, and build support facilities for those two groups on current MEF stage, which means, we can expect an air natonal guard squadron & medium to long range SAM in subsequent MEF stage
yeah you miss alot


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Trucks! You guys forget the trucks! Improvements in TNI's logistic back bone is of critical importance as well as the big ticket items.

Among the trucks include Renault Sherpa 2 playing panser intai roles, 2.5 ton PT-44 Maesas HMT in large numbers, Tatra 815s for the Marines


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Re: Minimum Essential Force (MEF) - Indonesia's Capability Upgrade Program
« Reply #10 on: April 30, 2014, 07:08:18 PM »
Here is the official list. Trucks, baby, is right up there!


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Here is the official list. Trucks, baby, is right up there!

Still doesn't include 1000 cargo trucks from Japan

TNI Pesan 965 Truk Isuzu Senilai US$ 110 juta

15-11-2013 16:55
Kementerian Pertahanan memesan 965 unit truk Isuzu untuk kebutuhan TNI dengan total nilai pembelian US$ 110 juta. Pengadaan truk untuk kendaraan taktis militer ini akan rampung sebelum Oktober 2014.

Demikian dikemukakan Wakil Menteri Pertahanan Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin saat meninjau pabrik Isuzu di Fujisawa, Prefektur Kanagawa, sebelah barat Tokyo, Jumat (15/11). Pemesanan truk angkut TNI ini terbagi atas dua bagian, yakni 665 unit berkapasitas 2,5 ton dengan sistem penggerak roda 4x4 dan 300 unit berkapasitas 5 ton dengan sistem penggerak roda 6x4.

Dana pengadaan 965 kendaraan taktis TNI ini sepenuhnya disediakan Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi UFJ sebagai lender melalui mekanisme pinjaman luar negeri. Pagu kredit untuk pembelian 665 unit kendaraan 2,5 ton 4x4 senilai US$ 50 juta. Sedang pagu kredit untuk pengadaan 300 truk sebesar US$ 60 juta.

Truk berkapasitas 2,5 ton yang berjumlah 665 unit seutuhnya diproduksi di Fujisawa, Jepang, karena permintaan pasar untuk truk dengan spesifikasi sebesar itu sangat minim. Konsumen Indonesia umumnya meminati truk dengan penggerak roda 2x4.

Harga on the road truk berkapasitas 2,5 ton yang diproduksi di Jepang sebesar US$ 74.500 per unit. Porsi biaya terbesar adalah cabin chasis yang mencapai US$ 54.300 per unit. Selebihnya adalah biaya winch US$ 4.900 dan karoseri US$ 15.300. Total biaya pengadaan 665 unit truk ini, d luar penambahan suku cadang dan biaya distribusi sebesar US4 49,5 juta.

Sedang harga on the road truk berkapasitas 5 ton 6x4 yang dibuat PT Isuzu Astra Motor Indonesia US$ 95.600 per unit. Porsi biaya terbesar adalah cabin chasis US$ 71.700, selebihnya, winch US$ 4.900 dan karoseri US$ 19.000 per unit. Di luar biaya tambahan suku cadang dan distribusi, total harga 300 unit truk ini sebesar US$ 28,6 juta.

Meski 665 unit truk Isuzu diproduksi di Jepang, perakitan dan pembuatan karoseri dilakukan di Indonesia, menggunakan pabrik PT Isuzu Astra Motor Indonesia. "Begitu dipesan, kami langsung produksi," kata Yohannes Nangoi, wakil presdir Isuzu Astra Motor Indonesia.

Pelayanan Purnajual
Ada tiga isu mengiringi pemesan truk Isuzu, yakni pertama harga yang dinilai lebih mahal, kenapa harus Isuzu, dan diproduksi di Jepang. Kedua, teknologi, dan ketiga, masalah purnajual. Yohanes menjelaskan, pabrik mobil di Indonesia belum memproduksi truk dengan penggerak roda 4x4. Pabrik yang ada hanya memproduksi truk yang paling banyak dipesan, yakni kendaraan dengan penggerak roda 4x2. Jika harus memproduksi truk 4x4, pabrik yang ada akan rugi karena produksi tidak memenuhi skala ekonomi.

TNI meminta truk dengan penggerak roda 4x4 agar lebih tahan medan berat. "Untuk isu pertama, daripada harus menggunakan kapasitas pabrik untuk memproduksi 4x2 dengan tambahan modifikasi menggunakan komponen dari Tiongkok atau negara lain, lebih baik memesan langsung dari Isuzu Motors Jepang yang sudah terbiasa memproduksi kendaraan dengan berbagai penggerak roda. Tak perlu modifikasi dan suku cadang tersedia, dan mutu sesuai standar internasional. Konsekuensinya, harga lebih mahal. Tapi, dengan kualitas ini, TNI punya kendaraan standar internasional. Jika diminta PBB untuk menjadi pasukan penjaga perdamaian, TNI tidak ada masalah dengan standar," ungkap Yohanes.

Kedua, Isuzu sudah menggunakan teknologi Euro-3. "Kami memakai common real engine yang disesuaikan dengan bahan bakar yang masih standar Euro-2 di Indonesia," kata Yohanes.

Ketiga, after sales service atau pelayanan purnajual. Ketersediaan sparepart Isuzu 24 jam. Untuk bisa memberikan pelayanan optimal sesuai janji, Isuzu memberikan pendidikan para mekanik. Setiap 15 unit dididik satu mekanik yang mempunyai kemampuan overhaul kendaraan. "Jadi akan ada 50-60 mekanik yang dididik untuk melayani truk Isuzu pesanan TNI yang mencapai 965 unit itu," ungkap Yohanes.

Isuzu Astra sudah mulai berproduksi tahun 2011 dengan kapasitas produksi 5.000 unit setahun dan penjualan 4.000 unit. Pada Januari 2015, pabrik Isuzu yang saat ini di Pondok Ungu, Bekasi, akan dipindahkan ke Karawang dan kapasitas produksi meningkat menjadi 18.000 unit per tahun. Isuzu pusat sudah menunjuk Indonesia sebagai basis produksi Isuzu untuk ASEAN.

Didirikan tahun 1916, Isuzu adalah pabrik otomotif pertama dan produsen truk terbesar di Jepang. Saat ini Isuzu dipasarkan di lebih dari 100 negara. Kapasitas produksi truk militer Isuzu Motors Jepang mencapai 700 unit per tahun.


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Firing test Avibras ASTROSS II for Indonesian army,

"We always consider the Philippines as a good friend, good neighbor and one of our strong partners in the region.”  (Indonesian Ambassador to the Phiilppines Yohannes Kristiarto Soeryo Legowo)


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Bell 412 EP, Mi-17V5 and Mi-35P (Army aviation)

KAI KT-01 Wong Bee and Grob G-120TP (Air Forces Flying School and display team)
"We always consider the Philippines as a good friend, good neighbor and one of our strong partners in the region.”  (Indonesian Ambassador to the Phiilppines Yohannes Kristiarto Soeryo Legowo)


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18 units of Kh-179 155mm
I Asked the US Special Forces : "What will you teach us? you failed in Mayaguez operation, You failed in rescuing the hostage in Iran and Son Tay prison in Vietnam! what will you teach us? your Failure????"  ~ Leonardus Benjamin 'Benny' Moerdani, Indonesian Army Commander 1983 -1988.