Author Topic: Revisiting "Silent War" by Victor Corpuz  (Read 10768 times)

Adroth

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Revisiting "Silent War" by Victor Corpuz
« on: September 22, 2007, 09:12:27 PM »
Its been 18 years since publication of "Silent War", written by AFP defector-turned-rebel returnee Victor Corpuz, in 1989. Many changes have happened since then:

-> Corazon Aquino was still president, and the fate of Hacienda Luisita in the face of land reform was still uncertain

-> The Philippine Constabulary was still part of the AFP

-> Cellphones had not yet become ubiquitous, and recommendations in the book centered around providing radios to the barangay intelligence nets

-> Corpus was still a Lieutenant Colonel. He later became Brigadier General, and ISAFP head

The book's opening chapter set the tone for the document: a critical assessment of the AFP's counter-insurgency campaign:

It would be sheer disaster, for instance, for the AFP to fight off poential Threat Forces by applying the AIRLAND BATTLE DOCTRINES enunciated in US Field Manuals. Such doctrinces and strategies may be well suited to the armed forces of major powers like the United States, but certainly not to the AFP which does not have the means and resources for applying such doctrines. Equally disastrous for the AFP would be to base its counter-insurgency strategy on the "Low Intensity Conflict" Field Manuals of the US Army. Such strategies and tactics on counter-insurgency have proved deficient in actual practice. For the AFP to blindly follow such doctrines is like "cutting the feet to fit the shoes".

The book called for an indigenous doctrine would govern the AFP's conduct of the fight against the CPP/NPA (the MNLF/MILF were not taken up). According to the "About the author" section, then LTC Corpuz was supposed to have been assigned to AFP J-3 (Operations) to work with the rest of the staff to finalize the strategy of "war of quick decision", which was the AFP's answer to the NPA's "protracted war" strategy.

Posts on this forum, however, suggest that this particular change has not occurred.

Training-wise, the officer corps of the AFP is basically trained for conventional warfare. All the required schoolings (Basic, Advance and GSC courses) are geared towards conventional war fighting.  As late as 2001, COIN subjects were added to these courses as there was a clamor to  come up with a COIN doctrine. As far as I know, none was yet adopted as every officer has its own unique experience that he considers effective. Everyone would love to say "ganito ginawa ko sa area ko....." so the specifics of COIN have been left to the imagination of the ground commanders while conventional warfare is central  knowlegde to all officers, supposedly.

This begs the question: What else has not changed?

-> How much of OPLAN KATATAGAN remains part of OPLAN BANTAY LAYA? The book was particularly critical of uncoordinated conduct of CMO & combat operations under KATAGAN, as well as its alleged reliance on Vietnam-style search and destroy operations

-> How widespread are Special Operations Teams in the different IBs?

-> Do we still spread our forces thin by maintaining static detachments?

-> How differently are today's CAFGU employed compared with martial law era CHDF?
« Last Edit: September 22, 2007, 09:18:00 PM by Adroth »
The campaign to establish a Philippine equivalent to DARPA / DAPA / DSTA: http://adroth.ph/srdp_roadmap_darpa/

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specter

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Re: Revisiting "Silent War" by Victor Corpuz
« Reply #1 on: September 23, 2007, 07:15:50 PM »

-> How much of OPLAN KATATAGAN remains part of OPLAN BANTAY LAYA? The book was particularly critical of uncoordinated conduct of CMO & combat operations under KATAGAN, as well as its alleged reliance on Vietnam-style search and destroy operations

-> How widespread are Special Operations Teams in the different IBs?

-> Do we still spread our forces thin by maintaining static detachments?

-> How differently are today's CAFGU employed compared with martial law era CHDF?

I will try to answer this questions as best as I can considering the sensitive nature of the topic (Assessments of the AFP's ISO Oplans are classified).

1. Oplan Bantay Laya builds upon the successful Oplan Lambat Bitag (OLB) presented in Silent War albeit with certain modifications (btw, the OLB was successful in bringing the enemy's strength .

2. The AFP still has a shortage of SOT-trained personnel (AFP SOT Center to provide better administrative support).

3. On the issue of detachments, the AFP still continues to deploy in static detachments.

4. CAFGU detachments have become more effective with the cadre battalion system. Their patrol bases have become hard targets. To illustrate, news  reports show the trend that NPA raids have now shifted to PNP detachments.


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Adroth

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Re: Revisiting "Silent War" by Victor Corpuz
« Reply #2 on: September 23, 2007, 07:38:31 PM »
Thanks Specter.  :beer:

To illustrate, news  reports show the trend that NPA raids have now shifted to PNP detachments.

This is both comforting and saddening. Good for the AFP . . . poor PNP.
The campaign to establish a Philippine equivalent to DARPA / DAPA / DSTA: http://adroth.ph/srdp_roadmap_darpa/

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darthnbs

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Re: Revisiting "Silent War" by Victor Corpuz
« Reply #3 on: September 23, 2007, 08:51:24 PM »
3. On the issue of detachments, the AFP still continues to deploy in static detachments.

4. CAFGU detachments have become more effective with the cadre battalion system. Their patrol bases have become hard targets. To illustrate, news  reports show the trend that NPA raids have now shifted to PNP detachments.

I got an impression that static detachments (firebases anyone?) have outgrown their usefulness in the insurgency campaign. This is no Vietnam war plain and simple and the role of the PNP and the CAFGU should be improved and intensified in their localities.

Please check the following article, this illustrates a very good point on local defense forces on an American perspective.

The Need for a Homeland Defense Force
Special Guest Article by Jimmy Horn
   
America Needs a Homeland Defense Force for the Twenty First Century.
http://usmilitary.about.com/library/weekly/aa102801a.htm

We need a new, and sometimes a revitalized military force, a million strong. It would be under the control of state governors, made up largely of volunteers, but with paid cadre, and would have an exclusive role of homeland defense. It would have no federal mission, a job for our National Guard.

Why has everyone heard of state sponsored terrorism and no one has heard of the state sponsored militia? Half of the states have a volunteer defense force, authorized under the U.S. Constitution and various state laws and constitutions. These units report to the Adjutant General -- a state uniformed and paid, two star general. Most people think of this official as in charge of the Army National Guard, Air Guard and in a single instance, a state Naval Guard, when not federalized. Typically, however, home defense force members are volunteers, buy most of their uniforms and equipment, and are quite often, I find, mostly ignored by those officials responsible for them. Public Affairs Officers of the Adjutant General often profess total ignorance of the group, except for passing out phone numbers which no one answers, and web site addresses which are largely out of date.

America is a nation of volunteers. Of course, there was the Minutemen (your local militia, CVOs if you will). Later, it was almost a civic responsibility to join the Lions, the Rotary, or Civitan. An added benefit of public service was an individual could network with other businesses and professions. However, these civic organizations have largely been on a long slow decline (except overseas), as the Internet and television have become substitute sources of information and networking.

As a result of the "War on Terrorism," there is suddenly a new civic necessity within our country, with a need for something a little bit stronger than neighborhood watch program. We are no longer threatened just by criminals, but by an organized, dedicated enemy, who is sadly, already in our midst. Indeed, neighborhood watch organizations could become units within the Homeland Defense Force.

However, before we deal with the benefits of a strengthened Homeland Defense Force, and the creation of one where none exist, we must deal with obvious questions. Why can't the National Guard and other reserve components do the job? The real problem with these forces is that a person, to participate, must join the Army, or the Air Force. This not only involves weeks of training, but physical, mental, and educational hurdles must be passed, placing the inductee -- who must also be below the age of 35 -- in the top ten percent of the Nation. Beyond these limitations, there is the problem of too much experience. Those with a bent for history remember the stories of the British Home Defense Force, which faced invasion by the professional hordes of Hitler's Reich. Silver haired lords and ladies flocked to the colors, along with children. Yet I, as a retired military person, cannot serve in the National Guard.

Beyond these problems are force limitations, posse comitatus when federalized, and the notorious issue of federalized Guardsmen being deployed overseas when the attack on one's home town occurs. Additionally, if a Guardsman serves for twenty years and follows the rules, he or she is entitled to eventual lifetime retirement pay, medical care and other services from a grateful nation. While such emoluments are fair, the costs would bring us an economy busting bill for the force size we are going to need in the future. Next, we could never get area familiarity from a professional or even part time force. Finally, there is something I call "mission explosion and priorities." There are now more missions out there than can possibly be filled by all the professional and part time forces at our disposal. On the other hand, priorities are illustrated by the age old question of whether a glass is half empty or half full. The obvious answer is it depends on whether you are drinking or pouring. The President will be excused if he places a higher priority on protecting the West Wing of the White House than protecting Hagerstown, Maryland. Indeed, he may mobilize your local guard unit to supplement security, thereby reducing the capability of the community to protect itself.

As the Chinese say, there is opportunity in adversity. I mentioned volunteer organizations. I happen to believe the Kiwanis and others can restore a lot of their community relevance by organizing, within themselves, a unit of the Homeland Defense Force. After organization, the group could be outfitted and trained by the same or a different civic organization. Individuals would contribute approximately 100 hours a year of "duty," but in many ways would be on duty 24/7. State recognition and other housekeeping chores would be a snap. Most of all, the unit would retain its community roots. Issues such as whether the group should be armed, ages for admission, and missions would be sorted out much easier as many community activists, familiar with the levers of local power, focus on the problem.

Finally, the Homeland Defense Force would have clout, rather than chasing along, begging things from the National Guard. Indeed, better support from the National Guard would probably be a result, as community leaders deal with military leaders. Hence why are CAFGUs sometimes supplied only with a garand and or carbine when the regular NPA is armed with M16?

I was recently embarrassed to read in a local paper where a local "leader" said it was difficult to tell citizens "what to do," other than to "be alert." Oddly enough, the same paper, less than a week earlier, reported a federal official describing many of the security problems facing our nation as a "local responsibility." What are we waiting for? Join, organize, or suggest the formation of a local Homeland Defense Force today. Once the group is operational and willing to contribute, state recognition will follow, as sure as the sun comes up every morning.


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Adroth

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Re: Revisiting "Silent War" by Victor Corpuz
« Reply #4 on: September 23, 2007, 11:01:11 PM »
I got an impression that static detachments (firebases anyone?) have outgrown their usefulness in the insurgency campaign. This is no Vietnam war plain and simple and the role of the PNP and the CAFGU should be improved and intensified in their localities.

Please check the following article, this illustrates a very good point on local defense forces on an American perspective.

. . .

America is a nation of volunteers. Of course, there was the Minutemen (your local militia, CVOs if you will). Later, it was almost a civic responsibility to join the Lions, the Rotary, or Civitan.

The program you suggest for CVOs and para-militaries dovetails nicely with the book's recommendation to deploy these groups in the following areas:

- Government friendly communities, to prevent the entry of NPA propaganda units
- To keep areas that have already been cleared of NPA influence clear

As Drkula related earlier, these forces are currently used as part of the "hold" phase of an operation. CVOs and para-militaries will not, however, work in all areas.

One key difference between US and Philippine settings is the source of the threat. Whereas the US is defending against foreign enemies who may or may not have local confederates that help them in their activities, the Philippines faces domestic enemies. In our case there are actually whole areas that are openly sympathetic to the rebel cause. This makes organizing pro-government CVOs and paramilitary groups in these areas difficult.

One of the crticisms put forth in the book regarding pre Lambat-Bitag CVO and CHDF usage was that the military organized them even in NPA base areas. Places where the AFP had not yet cleared. This meant that these relatively poorly trained and equipped civilians either sabotaged government operations by playing both sides of the fence or were all too easily overwhelmed. Either way, the paramilitaries became easy sources of additional arms for the NPA.

Although Corpus' initial work frowned on detachments, Specter's info actually suggests that the AFP has learned from lessons of the past and improved their detachments.
« Last Edit: September 23, 2007, 11:39:32 PM by Adroth »
The campaign to establish a Philippine equivalent to DARPA / DAPA / DSTA: http://adroth.ph/srdp_roadmap_darpa/

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texan

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Re: Revisiting "Silent War" by Victor Corpuz
« Reply #5 on: September 24, 2007, 12:25:40 AM »
Thanks Specter.  :beer:

This is both comforting and saddening. Good for the AFP . . . poor PNP.

seems like it is. So far this year most targets by the rebels had been "soft" ones, So far I had not heard or read if the PNP has any plans to have this taken care of.  Since Sec Def Teodor himself ordered a review with possible revision of the Defense planning guide I dont see why not include the PNP since it is a directive or a guideline  geared towards the elimination of the country's internal security threat which in theory is the national police's turf anyone from the PNP side that can enlighten us? who knows they might have something in the works?

http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/topstories/topstories/view_article.php?article_id=90210
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specter

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Re: Revisiting "Silent War" by Victor Corpuz
« Reply #6 on: September 24, 2007, 06:47:14 PM »
There are already efforts under way in fostering cooperation between the AFP and PNP through the issuance of several memorandas of agreement.

In the provincial, municipal/city level there are local peace and order councils that include among other policymakers (E.g. local executives, NGOs) the heads of AFP and PNP units in the area.

In fact in the "HOLD" phase the PNP is involved along with CAFGUs and CVOs in organizing an integrated territorial defense system.

=================
The PNP is under the Department of Interior and Local Government and is tasked to play a supporting role in internal security.

The Defense Planning Guidance is concerned mainly with the DND to include:

1. AFP
2. Government Arsenal
3. PVAO
4. Office Civil Defense
5. National Defense College of the Philippines
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shadowars

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Re: Revisiting "Silent War" by Victor Corpuz
« Reply #7 on: September 24, 2007, 07:04:59 PM »

The US military planners could still be reading this manual? and currently using the guidelines in Jolo? .. Handshake or Hand grenades or both?

US releases anti-insurgency guide
 
Haditha raised questions over US counter-insurgency tactics

The US military has released a new manual on counter-insurgencies - its first guide on the topic for 20 years.

The manual, which draws on lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan, underlines the need for troops to do more than fight.

Critics have accused the US military of inflaming insurgencies by failing to gain the trust of local people.

The US military says the 282-page manual, which contains chapters on intelligence and ethics in war, fills "a doctrinal gap".

'Handshake or hand grenade'

The US's first post-9/11 counter-insurgency manual tackles intelligence, developing and carrying out strategies and boosting local security.

    It's this part - nation-building, counter-insurgency - which is the hard stuff that we haven't trained for
Col Steve Boylan

 The manual says it aims to prepare US soldiers and marines "to be greeted with a hand grenade or a handshake, and to respond appropriately to each".

A spokesman for the US Army's institutes of military education said the manual "codifies a lot of what's happening in the field already".

Col Steve Boylan said it reflected the changing nature of war, which goes beyond traditional fighting into reconstruction and nation-building.

US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have faced criticism for being heavy-handed and for sometimes failing to discriminate between insurgents and civilians.

"It's this part - nation-building, counter-insurgency - which is the hard stuff that we haven't trained for," Col Boylan said.

The guide, written with input from humanitarian agencies and media organisations, underlines the importance of integrating civilian and military activities.

"Political, social, and economic programmes are usually more valuable than conventional military operations in addressing the root causes of conflict and undermining an insurgency," it reads.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6186987.stm
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darthnbs

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Re: Revisiting "Silent War" by Victor Corpuz
« Reply #8 on: September 26, 2007, 12:09:44 AM »
Since we are discussing the role of local militias/CVOs/CAFGUs I continued on to find other case studies wherein we can analyze how they are utilized.

Forgotten - A look at the changing roles of the Chinese militia system from its inception to the present

By Andy Bunk

Imagine a force of millions of Chinese civilians armed with assault rifles, guided missiles, artillery, and the ability to possibly use it, all directed by the Chinese Communist government. Such a force exists in China today in the form of the Chinese militia. Yet there is very little information on such a large well-armed force. For the last two decades the militia has fallen off the radar in both the Western media and in scholarly works. In the past two decades, few if any articles have been published on the militia and fewer still scholarly works have been written about this subject. As a result, the Chinese militia has become a relatively unknown organization. One might think that this lack of attention simply shows that the militia has become unimportant and or has no where near the influence it once did. But such a conclusion would be a major mistake. Throughout Chinese history, from ancient times to modern Communist rule, the militia has played a number of roles in both Chinese society and its defense strategy that have helped shape the China we know today while at other times the militia has appeared dormant. But the militia has always remained a resource available for use by the Chinese government in times of need. This paper argues that although the Chinese militia in some ways seems to have faded into the background again, it would be a mistake to conclude that the militia has become irrelevant.

The goal of this paper is to provide an in depth look into one of China’s most mysterious organizations and to explain what roles it plays in Chinese society and its defense policy today. The paper first looks at the history of the Chinese Communist The goal of this paper is to provide an in depth look into one of China’s most mysterious organizations and to explain what roles it plays in Chinese society and its defense policy today. The paper first looks at the history of the Chinese Communist militia to provide the reader with a thorough understanding of what roles the militia was originally created to play and how these roles changed in different periods. This provides a basis for understanding the range of functions that could be potentially performed by the Chinese militia. The second part of the paper, then, tries to explain the militia’s organization today and the roles it plays in its modern form. The lack of media articles or scholarly works focusing on the current situation of the militia in China, makes it difficult to provide as a clear picture of the militia as one might want. But references to militia in passing in the Chinese media reveals some of the roles it continues to perform and why it can not simply be ignored.

http://www.sinodefence.com/research/militia/Militia-Forgotten.pdf


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Paul kyre

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Re: Revisiting "Silent War" by Victor Corpuz
« Reply #9 on: September 26, 2007, 10:07:23 AM »
that book includes his former NPA days, as well as their tactics.
i think, its better to have the AFP must also use Guerilla tactics in counterinsurgency warfare.
ika nga:
PATAS na TAYO

“The enemy advances, we retreat;
 the enemy camps, we harass;
the enemy tires, we attack;
the enemy retreats, we pursue” -- Mao Tse Tung

that is what the AFP needs.
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Adroth

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Re: Revisiting "Silent War" by Victor Corpuz
« Reply #10 on: September 26, 2007, 11:02:40 AM »
that book includes his former NPA days, as well as their tactics.

Indeed.

Half of the book is devoted to how the NPA wages war against the government, and why government forces were ineffective in the 80s.

Quote
i think, its better to have the AFP must also use Guerilla tactics in counterinsurgency warfare.
ika nga:
PATAS na TAYO

“The enemy advances, we retreat;
 the enemy camps, we harass;
the enemy tires, we attack;
the enemy retreats, we pursue” -- Mao Tse Tung

that is what the AFP needs.

The book actually advocates a strategy that counters -- not copies -- the 16-character strategy that you listed.

The goal is not to be "Patas" with the rebels, but rather to use the AFP's inherent advantage to greatest effect. As the PA modernization motto went: "Never fight on equal terms".

Note how the book nullifies Mao's guerilla strategy on page 176

“The enemy advances, we retreat" - with the old search and destroy missions, the NPA retreated to their base areas, and the AFP pursued them. This gave the NPAs a chance to ambush the units one by one in pre-prepared kill zones. Since the "Venus Fly-trap" / gradual constriction strategy avoids search and destroy missions there will be no units for the NPA to ambush.

"the enemy camps, we harass" - this is why Corpuz was against detachments, since it spread out units into small, static, defensive positions. The book advocated keeping troops mobile. By specter's info, this has been applied to some extent. Detachments remain, however they have been re-inforced such that the NPA no longer consider them prime targets. Details of the change are understandably covered by OPSEC

"the enemy tires, we attack" - search and destroy missions sapped the our soldiers' energy, and drained their supplies. Thereby making them easy prey. By eliminating search and destroy missions, as per the book's recommendations, troops stay fresh thereby depriving the enemy of this particular window of opportunity. Another Mao strategy countered.

"the enemy retreats, we pursue” - our troops were most vulnerable when they are on the move, on the roads. The NPA exacted a heavy toll on our forces as they started and ended their relatively short-duration search and destroy missions. With the gradual constriction strategy, there was no retreat. Troops stayed in the battle area until the enemy was destroyed. Again, another strategy nullified.
« Last Edit: September 26, 2007, 11:07:43 AM by Adroth »
The campaign to establish a Philippine equivalent to DARPA / DAPA / DSTA: http://adroth.ph/srdp_roadmap_darpa/

Don't get mad at China. GET EVEN. Join the movement to defy a Chinese "order".


Pachada

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Re: Revisiting "Silent War" by Victor Corpuz
« Reply #11 on: September 26, 2007, 11:19:51 AM »
an expanded CAFGU with better trained , better paid militiamen will put into practice the 'Silent War' book.

I was thinking about an 80,000 man CAFGU or better still a 160,000 CAFGU with well-trained and better paid militiamen supported by a 10 army brigades(downsizing the 10 divisions) organized as mobile brigades to reinforce the territorial cafgus.

during wartime, the cafgu will be integrated into the army brigades and the brigades expanded again into divisions.

the cafgus will in turn be replaced by called-up ROTC reserves and so forth

this structure is similar in a way to the PNP where you have the stationary policemen supported bythe police mobile groups.

The PNP , army , marines in turn reinforce each other when there is overwhelming enemy force in their respective localities be it an enemy amphibious landing or a rebel attack on a police station or on an isolated cafgu outpost.

The PNP should be considered army standby reserve and should have at least 2 week army reserve training per year and 1 day training per month specially since the PNP has 120,000 policemen.

the CAFGU reserve who will replace the CAFGU when the CAFGU is integrated into the Army divisions during wartime can also come from the 800,000 barangay tanods who are being currently armed as reported in a recent news article.

With this we can put more than a million men under arms easily on short notice.
heres the tanod article:

820,000 village watchmen soon issued firearms

Dec 5, 2006

Local government executives in coordination with the Philippine NationalPolice are now in the process of screening an estimated 820,000 Tanods(village watchmen)who will become police auxiliaries. They will be issued rifles, uniforms and batons.Previously, they were only armed with sticks or bolos(machetes). According to a Philippine National Police official , the barangay tanods will betrained on how to spot and accost criminals and terrorists and how to helpthe police repel terrorist and rebel attacks. The massive arming of police auxillaries is part of the Philippine government's total plan to confrontthe twin threats of the Al-Qaeda allied Islamic groups and the communist NPA group. As routine procedure, the police auxillaries coordinates with the 60,000 CAFGU army (Militia) in supporting the Armed Forces and National Police against both internal and external threats.

2nd article:
Military to recruit 11,000 soldiers, militiamen

Oct, 2006 Malaya BY VICTOR REYES

PRESIDENT Arroyo has authorized the military to recruit as many as 11,000 soldiers and militiamen for the stepped-up fight against the communist New People’s Army. Armed Forces chief Gen. Hermogenes Esperon made the announcement yesterday following a command conference in Camp Aguinaldo. Esperon said 3,000 of those who will be recruited are soldiers for cadre and maneuver battalions while the rest, around 7,920, will be manning at least 90 Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (Cafgu) companies that will be formed. Esperon said the President, who wants the communist insurgency defeated before her term ends in 2010, gave the instructions last Thursday. "It (recruitment) will commence as soon as the Army is ready," he said. Esperon said the recruitment of the Cafgus will be concentrated in NPA bailiwicks in Central Luzon, Southern Tagalog and Bicol and in Samar, Caraga and Davao. "It is here where we will put up the new Cafgu companies," he said. A Cafgu company is composed of 100 men, of which 88 are regular Cafgus and 12 are regular soldiers who control the company. The Cafgus are usually recruited from among barangay residents. Esperon expressed optimism that the NPA strength will be reduced by half by 2010 because of the military’s intensified campaign. The NPA has at least 7,200 fighters. "In line with the President’s directive to defeat the CPP/NPA by year 2010, AFP efforts will concentrate on the most advanced guerilla fronts in the identified priority areas of our reinvigorated ISO (internal security operations) in order to relegate their capability – strength, firearms, and influence – to an inconsequential level," said Esperon. "Inconsequential level" means the reduction of the NPA’s capability by 50 percent, he said. "This effort shall include preventing their expansion in white areas to cut off operational, logistical and financial support," he said. Esperon said the Cafgu companies will serve and act as village defense and "stay-behind forces as our maneuver units move to their next targets." Army spokesman Maj. Ernesto Torres said there are 52,748 militiamen throughout the country. Esperon said the Cafgus recruits will undergo a rigorous testing and training. "This includes conduct of background investigation for these possible recruits…Their loyalties would be looked into," he said.
« Last Edit: September 26, 2007, 11:28:21 AM by Pachada »
The needs and interests of the Filipino is primary while that of foreigners is secondary.
However, some Filipinos are still uneasy about this and would rather be the apologists or defenders of foreign interests.

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Re: Revisiting "Silent War" by Victor Corpuz
« Reply #12 on: September 26, 2007, 11:27:44 AM »
60,000 cafgu plus 120,000 PNP plus 820,000 tanods plus 80,000 army plus 8,500 marines plus ??ROTC reserves = ??
The needs and interests of the Filipino is primary while that of foreigners is secondary.
However, some Filipinos are still uneasy about this and would rather be the apologists or defenders of foreign interests.

Adroth

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Re: Revisiting "Silent War" by Victor Corpuz
« Reply #13 on: September 26, 2007, 12:26:06 PM »
an expanded CAFGU with better trained , better paid militiamen will put into practice the 'Silent War' book.

As per specter's information, combined with information from Drkula, territorial army recommendations in the book have already been implemented.

The key point in the book's recommendations is that CAFGUs only be used in areas that have already been cleared of the NPA. They primary function is to hold cleared territory.

Quote
Esperon said 3,000 of those who will be recruited are soldiers for cadre and maneuver battalions while the rest, around 7,920, will be manning at least 90 Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (Cafgu) companies that will be formed.

. . .

A Cafgu company is composed of 100 men, of which 88 are regular Cafgus and 12 are regular soldiers who control the company.

Another nice find Mr. P.  :beer:

I'm adding this to the Cadre battalion thread: http://timawa.net/forum/index.php?topic=6509.0

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I was thinking about an 80,000 man CAFGU or better still a 160,000 CAFGU with well-trained and better paid militiamen supported by a 10 army brigades(downsizing the 10 divisions) organized as mobile brigades to reinforce the territorial cafgus.

Please cite the reasoning for these figures. Why 80,000? Why not 90,000? Why settle for just double of 80,000? Why so many? Let us all help create a forum culture that avoids pulling numbers from our rear ends. The best way to do that is to always share the logic behind these estimates.

Why downsize the divisions?

The whole point to cadre battalions was to ensure that the rest of the battalions in a brigade remain mobile. So the mobility element that you cited is already there.

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during wartime, the cafgu will be integrated into the army brigades and the brigades expanded again into divisions.

Since CAFGUs are essentially reservists, of course they will be integrated into the regular force -- along with the rest of the Ready Reserve units.
« Last Edit: September 26, 2007, 01:06:37 PM by Adroth »
The campaign to establish a Philippine equivalent to DARPA / DAPA / DSTA: http://adroth.ph/srdp_roadmap_darpa/

Don't get mad at China. GET EVEN. Join the movement to defy a Chinese "order".


Pachada

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Re: Revisiting "Silent War" by Victor Corpuz
« Reply #14 on: September 26, 2007, 01:50:14 PM »
if the CAFGU is better trained(same length of training as army), there is no reason why they can't mount offensive actions at least in nearby villages so they dont have to have the army play firemen specially since they know the terrain.

Why 80,000? it was something that i just thought to match the army strength of 80,000. well, if we want something more in-depth, I suppose an oversized-batallion cafgu force per province would be just about right for administrative purposes =). so if we have 72 provinces, then we can have 72,000 cafgu which was near the cafgu size in the 1980s. if we take into consideration that some provinces are bigger or more rebel infested, then we can round-up the figure to 80,000 cafgu =) we can also use a soldier to civilian ratio or a soldier to rebel ratio or even a philippine to OPFOR ratio(e,g, how many philippine soldiers needed to defend against a hypothetical enemey force of say 2,000,000 men

I think one good starting point for discussion can also be what the AFP thinks is the ideal reserve force size is since the cafgu is a component of the reserve.. In a jane's defense article from the 1990s, the AFP would ideally like 15 standby reserve divisions and 8 ready reserve divisions to complement the 8 active brigades(this assumes a future where the 8 active divisions has been pruned down to 8 territorial brigades and 1 or 2 'rapid deployment forces'-which I assume are the scout rangers , special forces supported by the light armor).


As per specter's information, combined with information from Drkula, territorial army recommendations in the book have already been implemented.

The key point in the book's recommendations is that CAFGUs only be used in areas that have already been cleared of the NPA. They primary function is to hold cleared territory.

Another nice find Mr. P.  :beer:

I'm adding this to the Cadre battalion thread: http://timawa.net/forum/index.php?topic=6509.0

Please cite the reasoning for these figures. Why 80,000? Why not 90,000? Why settle for just double of 80,000? Why so many? Let us all help create a forum culture that avoids pulling numbers from our rear ends. The best way to do that is to always share the logic behind these estimates.

Why downsize the divisions?

The whole point to cadre battalions was to ensure that the rest of the battalions in a brigade remain mobile. So the mobility element that you cited is already there.

Since CAFGUs are essentially reservists, of course they will be integrated into the regular force -- along with the rest of the Ready Reserve units.
The needs and interests of the Filipino is primary while that of foreigners is secondary.
However, some Filipinos are still uneasy about this and would rather be the apologists or defenders of foreign interests.