Author Topic: PLAAF air campaign vs Taiwan(invasion scenario)  (Read 38 times)

MCentaur

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PLAAF air campaign vs Taiwan(invasion scenario)
« on: April 08, 2019, 02:56:00 PM »
Self-explanatory:this excerpt only examines the aerial part of a Chinese invasion of the island.

Diplomat

Quote
Anatomy of a Taiwan Invasion: The Air Domain
    How would the PLA use its air power in a Taiwan invasion in a late 2019 time frame?

    By Rick Joe
    April 03, 2019

    (...SNIPPED)

    The Goals of PLA Airpower

    The PLAAF and PLANAF would be required to fulfill three main operational roles from the onset of T-day:

    First, air superiority. Flanker aircraft and J-10A/B/C would operate simultaneously with PLA strike missions to seize air superiority across the Taiwan Strait but likely not over Taiwan airspace proper (which would require SEAD and DEAD). Air superiority naturally would enable strikes at ROCArF force multipliers such as their limited number of E-2 AEW&C and P-3 MPAs, as well as to prevent ROCAF fighter aircraft from conducting strike sorties against PLA ships, bases and staging areas. The total number of modern 4th and 4+ generation aircraft in theater prior to the onset of T-day would slightly favor the ROCAF; however PLA strike and interdiction will likely greatly reduce the sortie rate of and availability of ROCAF fighters, if not outright destroy airframes on the ground, allowing PLA fighters to enjoy superior sortie rates. PLA fighters would be heavily supported by AEW&C, ELINT, and EW/ECM aircraft to provide superior situational awareness and networking to achieve their mission, a parameter where ROCArF fighters would be greatly disadvantaged.

    Second, strike, interdiction, and maritime strikes, to be conducted in conjunction with PLARF SRBM and LACM units for coordinated air and missile strikes against high value targets such as ROCAF/N/A airbases, ROCArF C4I authorities, ROCN naval bases, ROCN ships, ROCA units
, and identified IADS and AShM sites with related subsystems such as radar stations. Aircraft fulfilling this mission include H-6Ks carrying KD-20 LACMs and KD-63 SOMs, as well as JH-7/As, J-16s and possibly J-10Cs carrying KD-88 pattern SOMs. DAMs would not be utilized given the prerequisite for attaining air superiority and air control and the limited quantity and variety of DAMs seen in PLA service. JH-7/As and J-16s would also be important for the maritime strike role.

    Third, AEW&C and ISR and EW/ECM. PLA medium-large AEW&C aircraft such as KJ-500, KJ-200 and KJ-2000 aircraft would seek to maintain at least two persistent 24 hour orbits within Chinese airspace facing the Taiwan Strait for monitoring air and maritime activity and relaying information to PLA aircraft, ships, air defenses, and building overall situational awareness. Two or more ELINT and SIGINT aircraft would also operate at standoff range within defended Chinese airspace alongside two or more Y-8G/Y-9G standoff ECM aircraft operating against ROCArF air defenses, early warning radars and fighter aircraft.

    (...SNIPPED)
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